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Introduction 
 
 
Escalation in Ukraine 
Conflicting Interpretations Hamper International Diplomacy 
Sabine Fischer 
Russia and the West apply diametrically opposed interpretations of the crisis in 
Ukraine and the role of international actors. This lack of a shared understanding 
of events hampers international efforts to resolve the crisis through negotiations. 
The differences are rooted in opposing narratives about the development of regional 
and international relations during the past two decades. When formulating Western 
policy it is important to take account of the Russian narrative and the logic it creates. 
 
The Russian reading of the upheaval in 
Ukraine is essentially based on three beliefs. 
Firstly, the Russian leadership presumes 
that the mass protests and expulsion of 
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich 
coincide with Western interests and were 
not only supported but also orchestrated 
by the West. The objective of Western ac-
tors, they believe, is to install pro-Western 
regimes in the Russian neighbourhood to 
roll back Russian influence. The Western 
interest is understood not as encouraging 
democracy, but consolidating zones of 
influence. The Russian political elite sees 
Russia as a leading power in a multi-polar 
world and regards the former Soviet Union 
as its own sphere of influence. Outside 
interference here, for example in the guise 
of NATO expansion or European Union 
overtures, is regarded as a violation of Rus-
sian interests. From the mid-1990s to about 
the mid-2000s Moscow saw the United States 
and NATO as its most important rival for 
influence in the region. Since the advent of 
the Eastern Partnership in 2008/2009, how-
ever, this perspective has also increasingly 
included the European Union. 
Secondly, Moscow regards the events of 
21 and 22 February 2014 in Kiev as “an un-
constitutional coup and a military seizure 
of power”. Moscow bases its position on 
the agreement mediated by the German, 
French and Polish foreign ministers and 
signed by Yanukovich and the opposition 
on 21 February. Two points are especially 
emphasised: Firstly, the government of 
national unity provided in the agreement 
never came into being. Secondly, a con-
stitutional reform process was to run from 
March to September 2014, before the presi-
dential elections scheduled for the end of 
the year. This too, Moscow notes, is now 
impossible with presidential elections re-
scheduled for 25 May. Instead, the Russians 
say, the opposition broke the agreement 
and drove Yanukovich out of office. On the 
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 basis of this line of argument the Russian 
leadership denies the new Ukrainian gov-
ernment in Kiev any legitimacy and refuses 
to recognise it as a negotiating partner. 
From Moscow’s perspective only the Ukrain-
ian parliament still retains a vestige of 
legitimacy. 
Thirdly, Moscow sees the political stage 
in post-Yanukovich Kiev dominated by 
Ukrainian nationalists and extremists who 
threaten the physical safety of the Rus-
sian minority in the country. This theory 
was initially provoked by the new govern-
ment’s hasty annulment of a language law 
passed by Yanukovich in 2012 to strengthen 
the status of the Russian language. Rus-
sian politicians and commentators point 
to attacks on ethnic Russians and Russian-
speaking Ukrainians, and regularly claim 
increasing numbers of refugees from east-
ern and southern Ukraine crossing into 
Russia – but without supplying any credible 
evidence. 
It is points two and three that create 
Russia’s justification for its actions in 
Crimea. Under its military doctrine of 2010, 
Moscow reserves the right to deploy its 
armed forces if the security of Russian citi-
zens outside its borders is threatened. In 
the days following the intervention various 
political actors defined the group enjoying 
such protection very comprehensively to 
include ethnic and cultural Russians, all 
Russian-speakers or even the entire popu-
lation of Ukraine. To justify the annexation 
of Crimea the Kremlin leadership also cites 
a written request for assistance from Yanu-
kovich, whom Russia still regards as the 
legitimate Ukrainian president. In this nar-
rative the Russian actions in Crimea rep-
resent an attempt to stabilise rather than 
destabilise the situation in Ukraine. 
Russian Motives, Objectives 
and Messages 
In the framework of this narrative, motives, 
objectives and messages can be identified at 
various levels behind Russia’s actions. The 
fall of Yanukovich represented an immense 
loss of Russian influence in Ukraine. The 
new political actors in Kiev – the Ukrainian 
Fatherland Party Batkivshchyna, Svoboda 
and the representatives of the Maidan revo-
lutionaries – are forces with whom the 
Kremlin had poor relations or none at all 
prior to the revolution. To that extent 
the Russian move on Crimea is directed 
towards preserving or creating levers by 
which to maintain influence on political 
processes in Ukraine. 
At the regional level Moscow is send-
ing a strong message. Russia is claiming 
unrestricted hegemony in its immediate 
neighbourhood. Since returning to the 
presidency President Putin has made 
regional integration in the post-Soviet space 
his top foreign policy priority. Alongside 
its Customs Union, Moscow also wants to 
create a Eurasian Economic Union from 
2015. To date only Belarus and Kazakhstan 
are involved. However, from the Russian 
point of view Ukraine has always been cen-
tral to the success of its integration efforts. 
Now Moscow has shown that it will accept 
neither regime change nor a neighbouring 
state turning to the European Union, and 
that it is prepared to use military force to 
assert its hegemony. 
That message is also addressed to the 
European Union, the United States and 
NATO. By initiating a new territorial con-
flict in Crimea, Russia complicates not 
only domestic political processes in Ukraine 
but also the future development of rela-
tions between Ukraine and those Western 
actors. Thus the Kremlin can now hope to 
have dashed on any hopes the new govern-
ment in Kiev might have had of joining 
NATO. 
The Russian leadership has demon-
strated toughness and spoken a language 
that its Western counterparts are both 
unwilling and unable to reciprocate. It has 
presented itself as the government of a 
major power that, like other major powers, 
can ride roughshod over the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of another state. 
In fact, the intense international efforts 
to negotiate a solution can be seen – from 
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 Moscow – as enhancing Russia’s inter-
national status at least temporarily. 
The show of strength also has a domestic 
political function. The Russian leadership 
has responded to the mass protests against 
the rigged Duma election of 2011 and the 
return of Vladimir Putin to the office of 
president in 2012 with a conservative soci-
etal model enforced through repression. 
Here foreign policy plays an important role. 
It is, the message goes, obvious that Russia 
as a major power has to protect itself and 
its immediate sphere of influence from 
negative social and political influences 
from the West. Here the discursive circle 
closes: Western attempts to install “anti-
Russian regimes” in the Russian neighbour-
hood must be resisted with utmost deter-
mination and foreign policy becomes a 
source of legitimacy for the political leader-
ship in the conservative sections of Russian 
society. This simultaneously warns progres-
sive actors in society that harsh measures 
will be taken against any attempt to change 
the government. Here we see the same, 
albeit stronger, link between domestic and 
foreign policy that led to a strengthening 
of authoritarian tendencies inside Russia 
after the colour revolutions in Georgia and 
Ukraine a decade ago. 
The overarching motivation of the Rus-
sian leadership is to secure its own power 
and control internally and externally. Its 
resort to military force demonstrates how 
deeply it feels its power threatened by the 
events of the past weeks. 
On Dealing with 
Opposing Narratives 
Russia was, like the European Union, taken 
unawares by the events in Kiev. The force-
fulness and rapidity of the Russian response 
can be attributed to shock over its own mis-
calculation. This explains both its refusal 
to recognise the new rulers in Kiev and its 
intervention in Crimea. Moscow’s actions 
are thus simultaneously reactive and aggres-
sive, but within the context of the Russian 
narrative largely rational and logical. 
An expansion of the military interven-
tion to the eastern Ukraine would be very 
risky for Moscow and therefore appears 
unlikely. The ethno-political situation in 
Crimea is clearer than in the eastern prov-
inces, as are the economic and political 
interests. Ultimately, Crimea is a distinct 
and thus militarily controllable territory, 
while any intervention in eastern Ukraine 
would significantly increase the risk of 
confrontation with Ukrainian forces or even 
a proliferation of the conflict beyond the 
Ukrainian borders. 
But its narrative has put the Russian 
leadership in a discursive cage that it will 
find it difficult to escape. Moscow would 
have to retreat from its harsh stance both 
internally and externally. It would also 
have to revise or revoke the justifications 
for its actions to date. The loss of face for 
the Kremlin would be enormous, especially 
given that the narrative described above 
has been deeply entrenched into social 
consciousness by years of media coverage. 
This is also underscored by recent opinion 
polls that show large parts of the Russian 
population supporting the actions of their 
leadership. In view of the internal legiti-
macy function of foreign policy, any retreat 
from the established position and inter-
pretation could be costly and risky for the 
Kremlin. Moscow will therefore maintain 
its course of isolation and confrontation. 
For their part, the European Union and 
other Western actors cannot accept Russia’s 
military intervention, nor the violation of 
international law and the Ukrainian con-
stitution represented by the secession of 
Crimea and its integration into the Russian 
Federation. The European Council on 6 
March 2014 agreed a three-stage sanction 
mechanism to be applied if the Russians 
refuse to enter negotiations and instead 
further exacerbate the crisis. 
In the short term sanctions are likely 
to have the opposite effect than intended. 
Moscow will retaliate both against targeted 
restrictions imposed upon individual mem-
bers of the Russian political and business 
elite and against broader economic sanc-
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 tions. The stance of the Russian leadership 
towards its own opposition and civil society 
will harden further. The same applies to 
Russian policies in the region and at the 
international level. The political leadership 
is unlikely to back down until the economic 
consequences of sanctions are felt by repre-
sentatives of the political and economic 
elite (and possibly the broader population). 
Initially the opposite effect must be assumed, 
so the danger of spiralling escalation re-
mains large. 
That is not an argument against sanc-
tions, but a call for a realistic stance on 
their unintended negative consequences. 
A policy of sanctions must be accompanied 
by measures to cushion such unwanted 
side-effects. Offers of talks must be kept 
open. The European Union should also 
think creatively about how Moscow could 
be persuaded to make minor concessions 
without losing face. Ultimately, realistic 
criteria must be defined to ensure that 
sanctions can be lifted again. The European 
Union must continue to strive to promote 
exchange with Russian society. In this con-
text it is questionable whether the suspen-
sion of the visa negotiations should be 
prolonged. 
In its eastern neighbourhood the Euro-
pean Union should pursue a two-track 
course. Firstly it should keep a watchful eye 
on how and where the consequences of the 
present crisis become noticeable. This will 
be the case in Ukraine and very probably in 
Moldova, possibly also in Georgia. The Euro-
pean Union should stand by these states 
politically and economically as they cope 
with the repercussions. 
At the same time EU policy in Ukraine 
and towards other states in the region must 
not simply become the opposite of its Rus-
sia policy. It must sensitively take account 
of the internal political circumstances; 
specifically, a cooperative but also critical 
stance towards the new political leadership 
in Kiev is of decisive importance. But it 
must also realistically assess the conse-
quences of its policies for the region as a 
whole. In recent years the European Union 
has made a great mistake in stumbling 
blindly into a geopolitical zero-sum game 
with Russia over the post-Soviet space. A 
more self-critical attitude by both sides 
towards their own narratives could be an 
important step towards détente – if Russia 
were willing to play along. Regrettably that 
is not to be expected any time soon. 
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